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LEE PULLEY, M.D. and FHP OF 
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Case No. 880216 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a medical malpractice/wrongful death action that 
was commenced in the District Court of Weber County. The Dis-
trict Court granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
finding as a matter of law that the statute of limitations had 
run on plaintiff's claim. Appeal to this court has been timely 
made pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code Annotated, which 
grants appellate jurisdiction in connection with judgments over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdic-
tion. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. Whether plaintiff's medical malpractice action is 
barred by the limitations statute at §78-14-4, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
2. Specifically/ whether plaintiff discovered or reason-
ably should have discovered the negligence of the defendants 
during the limitations period. 
3. More specifically/ the extent or degree of knowledge 
that plaintiff must possess to trigger the statute of limita-
tions. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
A determinative statute of this appeal is §78-14-4/ Utah 
Code Annotated, which provides as follows: 
"(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
injury/ whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four 
years after the date of the alleged act/ omission/ neglect 
or occurrence/ except that: 
a) In an action where the allegation against 
the health care provider is that a foreign object has 
been wrongfully left within a patient's bodyf the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient discovers/ or 
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through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered/ the existence of the foreign object 
wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever 
first occurs; and 
b) In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering miscon-
duct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to 
fradulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs, 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all 
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability 
under §78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and 
shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, 
associations and corporations and to all health care pro-
viders and to all malpractice actions against health care 
providers based upon alleged personal injuries which 
occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provid-
ed, however, that any action which under former law could 
have been commenced after the effective date of this act 
may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time 
allowed under former law; but any action which under 
former law could have been commenced more than four years 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced only 
within four years after the effective date of this act". 
It is only the highlighted portion of the above statute that 
contains the language that is determinative. The remaining 
portions of the statute are not material to the issues on 
appeal. It is undisputed that this statute applies to wrongful 
death and survival actions. See §78-14-3(29) Utah Code Anno-
tated. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
Inasmuch as this case involves an adverse ruling from a 
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summary judgment, appellant is entitled to have the case re-
viewed in the light most favorable to her. Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); Lucky Seven 
Rodeo Corporation v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988). 
Thus, for purposes of the summary judgment and this appeal, the 
following facts must be considered as being true: 
Plaintiff Michelle Deschamps is the surviving daughter and 
personal representative of her mother Theda E. Schulz (R-l). 
Defendant Dr. Lee Pulley is a practicing physician and was 
employed by defendant FHP (R-l). 
Between the dates of June 29, 1984 and August 1, 1984, 
Mrs. Schulz was treated by Dr. Pulley and FHP for shoulder and 
chest pain (R-2). In treating this patient, Dr. Pulley pre-
scribed a regimen of drugs which induced a terminal disease 
known as vasculitis! (R-3). As a result of the drug induced 
disease, Mrs. Schulz was hospitalized at St. Benedicts Hospital 
on August 1, 1984, where she remained until her eventual death 
on October 30, 1984 (R-4). 
Prior to her death, Mrs. Schulz contacted an attorney in 
Ogden, Utah, James R. Hasenyager, to look into the facts 
surrounding her treatment by FHP (R-55). In October, 1984 
1
 Vasculitis is a disease of the blood vessels. 
See Dorland's Medical Dictionary. 
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Hasenyager obtained a letter report from the University of 
Utah Pharmacy Department indicating that there was little 
medical literature to support drug induced vasculitis (R-49). 
Hasenyager continued his investigation after the death of Mrs. 
Schulz and on December 31, 1984 filed, pursuant to §78-14-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, a Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice 
Action (R-16, 56). Hasenyager did not tell plaintiff that he 
had filed a Notice of Intent and she had no knowledge of its 
filing (R-46). Thereafter, in the spring of 1985, Hasenyager 
had all of the medical records reviewed by Dr. Gary Gordon of 
the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine (R-46, 56). 
Dr. Gordon concluded that plaintiff did not have a cause of 
action (R-56). Hasenyager then told plaintiff that he did not 
believe she had a valid claim and closed his file (R-56). 
Although plaintiff had received two adverse medical 
reports, and her attorney had declined to go forward with her 
case, she continued to feel "uneasy" about the circumstances 
surrounding her mother's death (R-46). She thereafter con-
tacted her present counsel, David A. Reeve, who agreed to 
obtain a further review (R-47). In May 1986, Reeve received a 
report from Dr. Howard Ravenscraft which confirmed that the FHP 
physicians had deviated from standard medical practice in the 
treatment of Mrs. Schulz and their actions were indeed the 
cause of her tragic and premature death (R-51). 
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After receiving the report from Dr. Ravenscraft, plain-
tiff's new counsel (being unaware of the Notice of Intent filed 
by Hasenyager) filed a new Notice of Intent on June 16, 19862 
(R-20); filed a Request for Prelitigation Panel Hearing on 
January 13/ 1987 (R-27); presented the matter to the Prelitiga-
tion Panel on November 2, 1987 (R-8); was notified of the 
Panel's decision on November 17 , 1987 (R-8); and filed the com-
plaint in this action on January 14/ 1988 (R-l). Plaintiff's 
complaint was met by a Motion for Summary Judgment (R-28) 
wherein it was alleged that the action is barred by reason of 
the Statute of Limitations at §78-14-4/ Utah Code Annotated. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was heard before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde of the Second Judicial District. 
Judge Hyde granted the summary judgment reasoning that plain-
tiff as a matter of law knew or reasonably should have known of 
her claim at the time Attorney Hasenyager filed the Notice of 
Intent on December 31/ 1984. That being so , Judge Hyde con-
cluded that the filing of the complaint on January 14/ 1988 was 
beyond the 2 year limitations period (R-86). 
2 Because of a possible defect in the elapsed time between 
the Notice of Intent and the Request for Prelitigation Panel 
Hearing/ and using an abundance of caution, counsel filed a 
second Notice of Intent on January 13/ 1987 along with the 
Request for Prelitigation Panel Hearing. This is not material 
to the issues on appeal. 
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It is plaintiff's position in this action that she made 
reasonable efforts to discover her claim and that she did not 
know, nor could she have reasonably known, of the negligence or 
the causation until May 1986 when she obtained the opinions of 
Dr. Ravenscraft. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's argument on appeal may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. §78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, authorizes the filing 
of a malpractice action within two years after the plaintiff 
"discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury". 
2. Utah authorities have held that discovery of the 
"injury" means discovery of the negligence which resulted in 
the injury. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). 
3. A mere suspicion of negligence does not trigger the 
statute of limitations. 
4. Whether or not plaintiff discovered or reasonably 
should have discovered the negligence is a fact question. 
5. The fact that plaintiff's prior attorney filed a 
Notice of Intention to Commence Malpractice Action without her 
knowledge, and later concluded from his investigation that her 
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case was not meritorious and closed his file, is not an abso-
lute event that would irrevocably activate the state of limita-
tions. At best, this is a fact to be considered with all other 
facts in determining plaintiff's conduct and knowledge, 
6. The trial court committed manifest error in holding 
that the statute of limitations had run as a matter of law, 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED AS THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DID NOT COMMENCE UNTIL MAY OF 1986 
Clearly the leading Utah case on the "discovery rule" is 
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)3 where the 
plaintiff did not learn of the defendant doctor's negligence 
until 3h years after it occurred. The knowledge came as a 
result of a report from an Industrial Commission medical panel. 
In a scholarly and exhaustive opinion this court squarely held 
"that the two year provision does not commence to run until the 
injured person knew or should have known that he sustained an 
injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action". 
Thus, the court stated: 
"Accordingly we hold that the term discovery of 
"injury" in §78-14-4 means discovery of injury 
and the negligence which resulted in the injury". 
3
 See also Christensen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 
(1968). 
- 8 -
In making the above ruling, the court reasoned a) that there is 
a great disparity of knowledge between those who provide health 
care services and those who receive themf and laymen simply are 
unequipped to diagnose the cause and effect of certain ail-
ments, b) that knowledge of the negligence ought to be required 
in order to prevent the premature filing of unfounded claims, 
c) that anything less than full knowledge might tempt some 
health care providers to not make full disclosure to their 
patients, or even suppress the truth, d) that the maximum 4 
year limitation period is reasonably short and adequately 
guards against difficulty in defending stale claims, and e) 
that a further safeguard against tardy claims is the require-
ment of exercising reasonable diligence. All of these consid-
erations, and more, are present in the instant case. Some of 
the more compelling arguments are as follows: 
1. Discouraging the Filing of Unmeritorious Claims. In 
Foil, the court makes the following statement: 
"The law ought not to be construed to destroy a 
right of action before a person even becomes aware 
of the existence of that right". 
The above also might logically be rephrased to state that the 
law ought not to be construed to compel an injured party to 
file an action before his attorney could ethically or legally 
do so. 
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Rule 11/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as 
follows: 
"The signature of an attorney (to a complaint) 
... constitutes a certificate by him that 
(the complaint) is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law... 
If a (complaint) is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court ... shall impose ... an appro-
priate sanction, which may include an order to 
pay to the other party ... reasonable expenses ... 
including a reasonable attorney's fee." 
Not not only does Rule 11 prohibit an attorney from filing 
unwarranted complaints, but this court has also adopted a 
strong position against the filing of appeals where there is no 
reasonable factual or legal basis for the appeal. Rule 33(a) 
and 40(a), Rules of Utah Supreme Court; Brigham City v. Mantua 
Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1988) (attorney's fees and double 
costs awarded for unwarranted appeal).4 The policy of the 
law is and rightfully has been to discourage unfounded claims. 
In light of this policy it is untenable to argue that Hasen-
yager should have proceeded with an action that he simply could 
not file without violating his responsibilites as an officer of 
the court. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's counsel, after making a 
diligent effort, didn't learn of any facts to justify 
4
 The Court of Appeals has also adopted the same policy. 
Rule 40(a) Rules of Utah Court of Appeals; O'Brien v. Rush, 744 
P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987). 
- 10 -
proceeding with the action. To now adopt respondent's position 
is to adopt a policy that would compel or encourage the 
premature filing of malpractice actions. If there is any type 
of suit that ought to be discouraged/ it is a suit against a 
professional where his reputation and practice might be 
adversely effected by even a nonmeritorious suit. These suits 
are expensive to defend and often involve significant emotional 
impact upon the defendant. Indeed, as pointed out in Foily one 
of the chief purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
was to prevent the filing of unjustified lawsuits against 
health care providers. Lawyers are under constant criticism 
from professional organizations and others because of alleged 
unfounded suits. Responsible plaintiff's Bar organizations 
such as ATLA and UTLA repeatedly admonish their members not to 
file unmeritorious suits. If there is anything the legal 
community doesn't need in this day and age of tort reform it is 
a policy of law that gives credibility to trigger happy 
plaintiff's lawyers. Plaintiff and her attorney James 
Hasenyager ought to be commended/ not punished/ for their 
exercise of restraint where they "suspected" negligence but 
could not after due diligence discover any facts to confirm 
their suspicions and to justify the filing of an action. 
2. The Effect of Filing a Notice of Intent. But for the 
fact that plaintiff's counsel filed a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Malpractice Action/ there is little doubt that her 
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action would not have been dismissed. Yet there is no reason 
why this single fact should become so absolutely determinative, 
especially where plaintiff had no knowledge of the filing and 
where counsel himself could not discover any facts to justify 
proceeding further. 
The effect of the trial court's ruling is to create out of 
thin air a new test, unsupported by statutory or case author-
ity, to start the statute running. The trial court is not free 
to do this. The critical test is whether plaintiff had know-
ledge of "the negligence that resulted in the injury" not 
whether her counsel filed a notice. 
After everything else is said and done, the real issue in 
this case is whether a subjective suspicion of negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff constitutes knowledge. If it does, 
then the trial court was correct in its ruling. But if that is 
the law it runs directly opposite to the philosophy of Foil v. 
Ballinger, supra, and flies in the teeth of virtually every 
principle and consideration given as a reason for that deci-
sion. 
One could not seriously and in good conscience urge that 
lawsuits ought to be encouraged where there is but a "suspi-
cion" of negligence. Suspicion is not knowledge of negligence. 
It is urged by the plaintiff that the knowledge required to 
start the statute of limitations ought to be a knowledge of 
facts that would lead a reasonable prudent person to believe 
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that he had a cause of action. In a malpractice case, the 
facts of negligence would almost always focus on the profes-
sional standard of care and whether there had been a deviation 
from the standard. In the instant case, such facts came to 
light in May 1986. Until that time, neither plaintiff nor her 
counsel had anything beyond a bare suspicion. 
3. No Serious Danger of Stale Claims. In fashioning a 
correct principle of law the court should not lose sight of the 
purpose of statutes of limitation generally — namely, to guard 
against the difficulty of proof created by the passing of time. 
In Utah, virtually all other negligence actions are cover-
ed by the 4 year statute of limitations at §78-12-25. This 
statute has worked well and without controversy for decades 
since the time of its passage. The health care profession, 
through its powerful legislative lobby, has been successful in 
getting special legislation to shorten medical negligence 
claims to 2 years from the date of discovery. But the same 
statute places a maximum time of 4 years from the date of the 
alleged act which is the same period that has historically been 
considered reasonable for everyone else.5 Thus, there could 
never be any legitimate danger from a stale claim. 
For purposes of this appeal, it must be accepted as true 
that the defendants negligently killed Mrs. Schulz and now 
5
 See Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987) holding 
that the 4 year provision operates as a statute of repose. 
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raise the statute of limitations as a technical defense. Under 
these circumstances, there is no reason for the court to adopt 
an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute**. 
4. Other Foil Considerations. In holding that discovery 
of "injury" means discovery of the negligence which resulted in 
the injury, the court in Foil v. Ballinger, supra, also empha-
sized that a different rule might discourage health care pro-
viders from candidly telling their patients of their mistakes 
in hopes that the statute of limitations might run before the 
patients are fully advised. The court noted that this would be 
an undesirable objective as "the law should foster a fulfill-
ment of the duty to disclose so that proper remedial measures 
can be taken and damages ameliorated". 
Another requirement under §78-14-4 is the duty of the 
plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence in determining the 
negligence and cause of her injury. This requirement adds 
another factor to discourage the bringing of late claim©. 
In addition, the entire picture must be viewed in the 
light of the tremendous disadvantage that any layman has of 
understanding medical implications, medical standards, medical 
6
 This court has held that §78-14-4, the subject statute, 
should be construed in a harmonious manner to promote justice 
by precluding it from becoming a procedural trap for the 
unwary. Forbes v. St. Marks Hospital, 754 P.2d 933 (Utah 
1987). 
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alternatives and the effects of medical treatment. Especially 
is this important in a case such as this where we are dealing 
with a rare disease that isn't entirely understood even by 
physicians. These factors weight heavily in favor of adopting 
a reasonably liberal discovery rule. 
All three of the above considerations apply every bit as 
much to the facts here as they do to the facts of Foil. 
5. Other Utah Authorities. Respondents in the lower 
court succesfully cited the case of Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 
694 (Utah 1980) in support of their motion for summary judg-
ment. Hove does not represent any departure from Foil v. 
Ballinger and in fact supports the position of the appellant. 
In Hove/ the lower court, after a full trial of the facts, 
found that the plaintiff had knowledge of her injury more than 
two years before she filed the action. Plaintiff was a pro-
fessional nurse with medical experience and the trial court 
found that she either knew or resonably should have known of 
the defendant's negligence. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the ruling pointing out that the issue was not whether 
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known, but whether the 
trial court could have so found on the basis of the evidence 
that was presented. The findings of the lower court were sus-
tained, but obviously the same evidence could have supported 
opposite findings if the court had believed the plaintiff. The 
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court cited Foil as authority for the proposition that know-
ledge is a fact question. There is a big difference between 
the instant case and Hove. In Hove, the case was reviewed with 
all facts to be considered in the light most favorable to the 
lower court's findings. Here all facts must be considered in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Plaintiff has not 
as yet been given the luxury of a trial and is entitled to her 
day in court as was Barbara Hove. 
An unfortunate and troublesome part of the Hove decision 
is the language on page 696 stating that the plaintiff there 
could have been expected to have recognized the possibility 
that the recurring discomforts were the result of the alleged 
negligent injection. The word "possibility" was picked up in a 
later federal case? and was also used by Judge Hyde as a 
standard wherein he held that plaintiff need only know of the 
possibility of negligence in order to activate the statute of 
limitations (R-87). This obviously needs to be clarified by 
the court, as there are three possible meanings to the use of 
this language in Hove. They are: 
1. The word "possible" could have been used inocuously or 
7 See Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp 152 (D. Utah 1984). 
In Hargett, Judge Winder listed the elements as 1) the exis-
tence of any injury, 2) its cause, and 3) the possibility of 
negligence. There the cause was known, but plaintiff believed 
the negligence would be difficult to prove. In the instant 
case, plaintiff not only had no facts to show negligence but 
she had no facts to establish causation until May of 1986. 
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inadvertently merely in the sense to confirm the fact that the 
trial court had made an actual finding of knowledge or imputed 
knowledge on the part of plaintiff. If this is the case, the 
language is taken entirely out of context by the respondent and 
by the lower court. Plaintiff believes this to be the most 
logical explanation for the language. 
2. It also could mean that the plaintiff in a malpractice 
action must know of some fact to confirm the possibility of 
negligence. If this is the case, the trial court still would 
have committed error because here the plaintiff didn't know of 
a single fact to confirm even the possibility of negligence 
until May 1986. Nor did she know of any fact to confirm the 
cause of the disease. 
3. It could also mean that a suspicion of negligence 
satisfies the statute since anything is "possible"**. if this 
is the case, then Foil v. Ballinger is emasculated and plain-
tiff loses this appeal. For the reasons argued in pages 8 thru 
16 of this brief, plaintiff does not believe this alternative 
to be a proper interpretation of the statute. 
Another case relied upon by the respondents is Magoc v. 
Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1986) wherein the statute of 
limitations was deemed to have commenced when plaintiff's 
8 This is the position that was successfuly argued to the 
trial court by the respondent (R-73). 
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counsel sent a demand letter to the defendant describing the 
claim. That case likewise is not in point as it was admitted 
there that plaintiff knew of the malpractice but just didn't 
know the full extent thereof9. In any event, Magoc isn't 
binding upon this court; the Utah Supreme Court doesn't need 
help from a federal court to interpret its own opinions. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to May, 1986, plaintiff in this action had nothing 
mare than a subjective suspicion of defendant's malpractice. A 
suspicion is not knowledge. This court should not adopt a rule 
that would promote the filing of lawsuits against professionals 
based upon mere suspicions. There are other adequate safe-
guards that protect against the filing of stale claims. 
Plaintiff's knowledge is a fact question. The degree of 
knowledge necessary to trigger the statute of limitations ought 
to be a knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent 
person to believe that he or she had a cause of action. Plain-
tiff ought to be entitled to present her evidence on this issue 
to the trier of facts. 
It is respectfully urged that the summary judgment in this 
9
 See also Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital, 663 F. Supp 781 
(D. Utah 1987) . 
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case be reversed and that plaintiff's action be reinstated in 
the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
David E. West 
David A Reeve 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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